Diamond Thoughts

During the Kashmir War of 1947-48 Captain Lachhman Singh Lehl was serving with 11 Field Regiment equipped with the iconic Ordnance quick-firing 25-pounder field gun (mainstay of Indian artillery from 1940 to the 90s). During operations in and around Jhangar he was the forward observation officer (FOO) with units of 50 Parachute Brigade seeking to drive regular Pakistani troops from the area, liberate Rajauri and lift the siege of Poonchh.

Throughout these operations he brought down accurate, well-timed artillery fire on enemy positions under most taxing conditions. On 15th March 1948, precise artillery fire by his battery helped extricate a company of 3rd Maratha Light Infantry (now 2nd Para Special Forces), which had been pinned down by heavy fire from enemy automatic weapons and mortars. Spotting and directing fire from a position exposed to the enemy’s observation and fire he continued to engage them for a period of eight hours. Characteristically disregarding his own safety, he remained continually exposed to Pakistani sniper fire and bombardment by their 3-inch mortars. The Marathas were able to successfully disengage saving many casualties. Again, on 16th March, during the decisive battle for Jhangar at Thil, Lehl successfully engaged enemy defences, his battery’s fire support shooting 3 Maratha Light Infantry on to their objective. In the words of his Vir Chakra citation, ‘Captain Lachhman Singh Lehl showed calmness and courage in the discharge of his duties and distinguished himself in all the important battles in and around Naushera’.

Belonging to Hoshiarpur district, Punjab he joined the Army in 1943 serving with the Artillery in Burma. After the war he was part of the occupation force in Indonesia (the British were trying to bring back Dutch colonial rule being opposed by Indonesian freedom fighters). Serving with Punjabi Muslim troops he noticed the bonhomie among various ethnic classes in the Army. His battery’s senior Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer (VCO), a Subedar asked for a hundred rupees from the sub-unit’s funds to entertain the Dogra company lodging in transit in their camp. An affability which was sadly much impaired a couple of years later at Partition though the discipline and unit cohesion remained.

Moving to 11 Field Regiment he fought in the battles of Chhamb, Rajauri, Uri and Zojila besides Naushera and Jhangar in 1947-48 being decorated with the Vir Chakra. Going up the promotion ladder he commanded 3 Field Regiment (now 3 Medium and in the news for its fighting spirit in an infantry role in the recent clashes in Galwan) in the early 60s. The 1965 war saw him in the nerve-centre of military policy and planning, the Military Operations Directorate at Army HQ. A couple of days after the superb defensive battle at Asal Uttar he got a call from Major General GS Gill. Military Secretary to President S. Radhakrishnan. Apparently after a failed attempt to drive Pakistani forces from the territory they still held in Khem Karan sector some 130 officers and men from a Sikh battalion had been taken prisoner. Pakistan was milking the reverse for all it was worth, alleging that Sikh troops didn’t have their hearts in the fight (propaganda that we’re all too familiar with nowadays). The President wanted to know if there was any substance in the allegations. Always forthright and upfront, Lehl debunked the Pakistani propaganda pointing towards the good performance of Sikh soldiers in all sectors and the fact that a good proportion of higher commanders like Air Marshal Arjan Singh, Lieutenant Generals Harbaksh Singh and JS Dhillon and Major Generals Amrik Singh, Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’, Mohinder Singh and Gurbaksh Singh were Sikhs. For good measure he added that if Sikh soldiers on the frontline were to come to know that their Supreme Commander had doubts about them on account of enemy disinformation it would severely impact their morale.
After the war he commanded 301 Mountain Brigade in Assam and rose to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 20 Mountain (Kirpan) Division tasked with the defence of Bhutan. 1971 saw him taking the offensive with a view to liberating North-Western Bangladesh operating under XXXIII Corps.

Pakistan held the hour-glass shaped region with an infantry division and some paramilitary forces. XXXIII Corps’ aim was to tie down the enemy forces preventing them from withdrawing for the defence of the Dhaka bowl, their vital strategic ground. Lehl’s divisional plan envisaged holding the Balurghat bulge (located in the waist-line of the enemy’s territory) with a brigade as a firm base for developing thrust lines to capture important communication centres thereafter exploiting to the Ganga river (known as the Padma in Bangladesh). Initial operations in November were aimed along the Hilli-Gaibanda approach. Its importance lay in it being the shortest route to enter from the Balurghat bulge and sever Pakistani lines of communication. The prime objective was the major infrastructure hub of Bogra.

Costly frontal attacks made little progress. Lehl, always well up to get a proper feel of the battle, changed his approach, effecting a left-hook with another formation. His troops got behind the enemy with an outflanking move from the North and established a block in the rear of the Pakistani positions. Thereafter a series of outflanking cross-country moves got the better of the enemy. The enemy, led by redoubtable commanders like Brigadier Tajjamul Hussain Malik fought well but were confused by Lehl’s lithe approach, go-around manoeuvres and the hunger of his troops for victory.

Though reinforced with another brigade by now, Major General Pir Nazar Hussain Shah, commander of Pakistan’s 16 Division had no choice but to surrender his command after the capture of the fortress-town of Bogra. Lehl, flexible and usually a step ahead in his moves had prevailed his leadership and achievement being recognised by the award of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM). The enemy had been tied down, unable to go to the aid of the embattled Dhaka garrison and defeated in detail. They had fought well though and in a determined manner particularly at Hilli.

Lachhman Singh Lehl was Deputy Quartermaster General after the war at Army HQ looking after logistics and then commanded Bengal Area at Kolkata. His supersession in 1976 came as a great shock to professionals and fighting soldiers. He bowed out gracefully to start a new career as a writer. His first book, ‘Indian Sword Strikes in Bangladesh’ was a first-person account of his experiences in the 1971 war and the operations of his formation. The larger campaign in East Pakistan was the subject of his second book, ‘Victory in Bangladesh’. Both were very well received and are essential reference books for students of military history. His crowning achievement was his book on lessons learned from the 1965 war, ‘Missed Opportunities’, which I strongly felt should’ve been made a standard text-book. The General made a substantial contribution to the organisation of gallantry-awardees, the War Decorated India.
General Lehl passed away on 20th June 2020. A generation of warriors who served this country well, defended the fledgling nation and insulated the military from politics is now on the verge of fading away. His memory brings back thoughts of the greatest feat of Indian arms – the establishment of a new country in under a fortnight. Significant that the armies liberating Bangladesh were unleashed by a sagacious political executive on firm, lucid orders with their full backing.

• Mandeep Singh Bajwa